Abstract. In this paper, we describe efficient forgery and full-key recovery attacks on the -IC − signature scheme recently proposed at PKC 2007. This cryptosystem is a multivariate scheme based on a new internal quadratic primitive which avoids some drawbacks of previous multivariate schemes: the scheme is extremely fast since it requires one exponentiation in a finite field of medium size and the public key is shorter than in many multivariate signature schemes. Our attacks rely on the recent cryptanalytic tool developed by Dubois et al. against the SFLASH signature scheme. However, the final stage of the attacks require the use of Gröbner basis techniques to conclude to actually forge a signature (resp. to recover the secret key). For the forgery attack, this is due to the fact that Patarin's attack is much more difficult to mount against -IC. The key recovery attack is also very efficient since it is faster to recover equivalent secret keys than to forge.
Introduction
Multivariate cryptography proposes efficient cryptographic schemes well-suited for low computational devices. Since the underlying problem is not known to be easy in the quantum model, these schemes have been considered by standardization bodies as alternatives to RSA or DLog based schemes. For instance, in 2003, one promising signature scheme, called SFLASH, has been selected by the NESSIE project. SFLASH is based on the C * cryptosystem [20] proposed by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988 and broken by Patarin in 1995 [21] . Following an idea of Shamir [25] , Patarin, Goubin and Courtois proposed SFLASH [24] by removing some equations of the system. The scheme is also called C * − and the generic transformation of removing equations is called the "Minus" transformation which can be applied to many multivariate schemes.
Multivariate cryptography provides public-key cryptosystems whose security is related to the problem of solving systems of quadratic or higher degree equations in many variables. This problem is known to be NP-hard and it seems to be also difficult on average. The today most efficient algorithms to solve this generic problem are Gröbner basis algorithms whose complexity is exponential in time and space. But this general tool can perform much better in the cryptographic context since the security does not rely on hard instances. As usual in multivariate cryptography, hard instances of this NP-hard problem are hidden using linear mappings and in some cases, Gröbner basis algorithms are able to recover the hidden structure [15] . Fortunately, some countermeasures are known to avoid this kind of attack. But are there sufficient to avoid all attack ?
Recently, some breakthrough results [11, 10] have been achieved in the cryptanalysis of multivariate schemes and have lead to the efficient break of SFLASH in practice. In this work, some cryptanalytic tools have been developed which are very generic and efficient since only linear and bilinear algebra are used. They can be seen as differential cryptanalysis applied on multivariate scheme but the treatment of the differential of the public key is the main important point. The idea is to compute the differential of the public key and then to study the differential function as a bilinear function when the internal mapping is a quadratic function. The differential mapping at some point, or fix difference, is a linear map, but if we let the point to vary, we get a bilinear map. Then, in [11] , the authors are able to characterize the self-adjoint operators of these bilinear functions, also called skew-symmetric linear map with respect to the bilinear function, and they show that they can be used to recover missing coordinates. For SFLASH, they show that they correspond to the conjugate by one linear and secret map of the multiplications in the extension. Finally, once all the missing equations have been recovered, Patarin's attack can be used to forge a signature for any message.
Main Results. The -IC signature scheme has been proposed by Ding, Wolf and Yang at PKC 2007. They propose a new quadratic function based on the Cremona mapping over E, an extension of a finite field. The advantages of this function is to be more efficient to invert than SFLASH for instance, one inversion in the finite field of q k elements, and to provide short public key. For example, the number of quadratic polynomials of the public key P is qn where n is the product of the extension field k and the number of coordinates of the Cremona map. It can be seen that the parameter k must be large enough to avoid some attack, and must be small if we want to have short public key. In general, will be equal to 3 or 5, in the parameters proposed by the authors.
In this paper, we show that the recent tools developed for SFLASH are generic and can be used to other multivariate schemes. We will use these tools to recover the missing coordinates of the -IC − scheme. Once the whole set of equations of the public key is recovered, Gröbner basis techniques can be used either to forge a signature for any message or to recover the secret key. The key recovery uses the fact that we are able to characterize and recover equivalent secret keys. More precisely, we recover two linear mappings S 0 and T 0 such that if we compose the public key P with them, T −1 0
0 , the new system of polynomials are equivalent to T • F • S , where F is the central mapping and S and T are two linear mappings defined over the extension E. Finally, the description of a -IC public key in E is easy to invert using Gröbner basis technique, since the number of unknown is small if is small.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we recall some classical definitions and properties of Gröbner basis. Then, in Section 3, we describe the -IC − signature scheme. We also describe the scheme = 3, which is the version proposed in [9] . In Section 4, we describe a special property of the differential of this new quadratic scheme. This property, together with Gröbner basis techniques, will permit us to mount an efficient forgery (Section 5) and full key recovery attacks (Section 6).
Gröbner Basics
We present here Gröbner basis and some of their properties. We will touch here only a restricted aspect of this theory. For a more thorough introduction to this topic, we refer the interested reader to [1, 8] .
Definition -Property
We will denote by K a finite field of q = p r elements (p a prime, and r ≥ 1). We shall call ideal generated by p 1 , . . . , p s ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x n ], denoted by p 1 , . . . , p s , the set :
We will denote by V K (I) = z ∈ F n q : p i (z) = 0 ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s the variety associated to I. Gröbner bases offer an explicit method for describing varieties. Informally, a Gröbner basis of an ideal I is a computable generating set of I with "good" algorithmic properties. These bases are defined with respect to monomial orderings. For instance, the lexicographical (Lex) and degree reverse lexicographical (DRL) orderings -which are widely used in practice -are defined as follows:
β i and the right-most nonzero entry of α − β is negative.
Once a (total) monomial ordering is fixed, we can introduce the following definitions :
is the largest monomial (w.r.t. some monomial ordering ≺) among the monomials of p. This leading monomial will be denoted by LM(p, ≺). The degree of p, denoted deg(p), is the total degree of LM(p, ≺).
We are now in a position to define more precisely the notion of Gröbner basis.
Gröbner bases computed for a lexicographical ordering (Lex-Gröbner bases) permit to easily describe varieties. A Lex-Gröbner basis of a zero-dimensional system (i.e. with a finite number of zeroes over the algebraic closure) is always as follows
To compute the variety, we simply have to successively eliminate variables by computing zeroes of univariate polynomials and back-substituting the results.
From a practical point of view, computing (directly) a Lex-Gröbner basis is much slower that computing a Gröbner basis w.r.t. another monomial ordering. On the other hand, it is well known that computing degree reverse lexicographical Gröbner bases (DRL-Gröbner bases) is much faster in practice. The FLGM algorithm [14] permits -in the zero-dimensional case -to efficiently solve this issue. This algorithm use the knowledge of a Gröbner basis computed for a given order to construct a Gröbner for another order. The complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the number of solutions of the ideal considered.
DRL-Gröbner bases have another interesting property. Namely, these bases permit to recover low-degree relations between the inputs/outputs of a vectorial function
We shall call ideal of relations of f the set :
describes all the (independent) algebraic relations between the inputs/outputs of f . In particular, G contains a linear basis of the polynomials
Note that in the cryptographic context, the ideals (of relations) are usually radicals. We can indeed always include the field equations. So, this condition is not really restrictive.
Computing Gröbner bases
The historical method for computing Gröbner bases is Buchberger's algorithm [6, 5] . Recently, more efficient algorithms have been proposed, namely the F 4 and F 5 algorithms [12, 13] . These algorithms are based on the intensive use of linear algebra techniques. Precisely, F 4 can be viewed as the "gentle" meeting of Buchberger's algorithm and Macaulay ideas [19] . In short, the arbitrary choices -which limit the practical efficiency of Buchberger's algorithm -are replaced in F 4 by computational strategies related to classical linear algebra problems (mainly the computation of a row echelon form).
In [13] , a new criterion (the so-called F 5 criterion) for detecting useless computations has been proposed. It is worth pointing out that Buchberger's algorithm spends 90% of its time to perform these useless computations. Under some regularity conditions, it has been proved that all useless computations can be avoided.
A new algorithm, called F 5 , has then been developed using this criterion and linear algebra methods. Briefly, F 5 constructs incrementally the following matrices in degree d :
where the indices of the columns are monomials sorted for the admissible ordering ≺ and the rows are product of some polynomials f i by some monomials t j such that deg(t j f i ) ≤ d. For a regular system [13] (resp. semi-regular system [3, 4] ) the matrices A d are of full rank. In a second step, row echelon forms of theses matrices are computed, i.e.
. . . O(n ω·dreg ); more details on this complexity analysis, and further complexity results, can be found in [3, 4] .
To date, F 5 is the most efficient method for computing Gröbner bases, and hence zero-dimensional varieties. From a practical point of view, the gap with other algorithms computing Gröbner bases is consequent. Notably, it has been proved [2] from both a theoretical and practical point of view that XL [7] which is an algorithm proposed by the cryptographic community for solving overdefined system of equations -is a redundant version of F 4 and less efficient than F 5 .
3 The -IC − Signature Scheme
In this part, we describe the -IC − multivariate signature scheme proposed at PKC'07 by Ding, Wolf and Yang [9] . Note that our description differs from the original description given by the authors of [9] ; allowing us to present our attacks in a concise way. The design principle of -IC schemes is classical in multivariate cryptography. Namely, we start from a well chosen algebraic system F which is "easy" to solve, and then hide this central system using linear and invertible transformations S and T following the idea of McEliece's cryptosystem :
For -IC, the central function F in E[X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X ] is obtained by considering the so called Cremona mapping which is defined -over an extension E of degree k of K -as follows :
This function can be invertible for well chosen parameters and it is efficient to invert since only one inversion in E is required: once X 1 is recover, only division can be used as we will see in the sequel since except λ 1 , all other λ i can be set to 0. The public key consists in P and to sign a message m of n bits, we inverse it using T , we compute an inverse of F, and finally we inverse S to find a preimage s of m for the function P. To verify a signature s, it is sufficient to evaluate the public key P and check that it is equal to the message m. We introduce now some notations in order to provide a compact representation of F. We will denote by x ⊗ y the component-wise multiplication of x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y ), i.e. :
x ⊗ y = (x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 2 , . . . , x y ).
Moreover, R will denote the left rotation operator, namely :
With these notations, the central map F can be expressed as :
In order to combine F with the two secret transformations S and T , we have to consider some canonical bijection Φ of K k onto E . So, F operates on E and inria-00556688, version 1 -17 Jan 2011
In the sequel, we may avoid the writing of Φ when the context is obvious. Hence, we can express F and therefore the public key P as a system of n = · k polynomials of n variables over K. Since S, T , R, and E Λ are K-linear, the polynomials of P are quadratic over the n variables of K. In expression (1), note that S can be seen as a change of input variables of F, and T as a change of output variables of F.
We now would like to consider the simplest expressions for F. The authors of [9] remarked that it is useless to consider expression like F(x) = E Λ1 (x) ⊗ R E Λ2 (x) . The exponentiation E Λ2 would be absorbed by the external morphism S. In the same spirit, if we consider
then we have the following equality:
The exponentiation E Λ would be absorbed by the external transformation T . For Λ, we can then limit the choice to vectors such as (λ, 0, . . . , 0). Thus, a simple expression for F is given a follows :
for some integer λ.
Ding, Wolf and Yang gave explicit formulae [9] for inverting F when possible, since invertibility of F is required in the signature scheme:
-If is even, we must have gcd(q λ − 1, q k − 1) = 1. Since q − 1 divides q λ − 1 and q k − 1, we must have q = 2. -If is odd, we must have gcd(q λ + 1, q k − 1) = 1. So in this second case, the choices are λ = 0 when q is even and otherwise λ > 0 and k/gcd(k, λ) odd (according to [11] ).
Then, for a practical signature scheme, the authors of [9] have considered the effects of some known attacks and some modified versions of the main scheme -IC supposed to defeat those attacks. Particularly for even, -IC scheme is vulnerable to the UOV attack [18, 17] . So even values of should be avoid. Then, the authors suggested a modified version, the "Minus" scheme, named IC − . The point is to remove r polynomials among the description of P. It increases the complexity of Patarin and Faugère-Joux attacks by a factor q r . As a counterpart, the scheme can only be used for signature since exhaustive search is also impossible for legitimate user.
In the sequel, we will denote by P Π ∈ E[X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X ] the corresponding truncated public key (i.e. the composition of P with a suitable projection Π). Finally, the authors propose the following sets of parameters :
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Differential and Multiplication of -IC
In this part, we present some tools adapted for the cryptanalysis of multivariate systems. We introduce the definition of the differential and we show a special property of the differential of the central map F of -IC. In the next section, we show that this property translated onto the public key enables to retrieve special linear applications, which beraks the "Minus" scheme of IC − .
Differential of the Public Key
For a generic application F in one variable, its differential DF is a symmetric function in two variables defined as :
In the case of the central map F of -IC, we get explicitly:
Note that in this case since F is quadratic function, DF is symmetric bilinear function. The differential DP of the public key P is also a bilinear symmetric function and is linked to the differential of the central map F by the following relation :
DP(X, A) = T (DF(S(X), S(A))).
Furthermore, the differential DP can be explicitly computed from the expression of the public key P since the differential operator operates linearly on functions and it can be easily computed on monomials.
Characteristic Properties of the Multiplications
Since R and E Λ are multiplicative,i.e. for all (X, A), R(X ⊗ A) = R(X) ⊗ R(A) and E Λ (X ⊗ A) = E Λ (X) ⊗ E Λ (A), we have the multiplicative property of the differential DF, for all ξ, X, A in E :
For simplicity, we now introduce the following notations: M ξ (X) = ξ ⊗ X the multiplication by ξ in E and N ξ = S −1 • M ξ • S and L(ξ) = E Λ (ξ) + R(ξ). The key idea is the following statement. Lemma 1. The K-linear applications M that satisfy for all X, A in E :
are precisely the multiplications M ξ with ξ satisfying L(ξ) = 0.
Proof Due to the property (3), we first look for the linear applications M and M that satisfy for all X, A in E :
We now express M and M in a well chosen basis, and then we show that the coordinates of M are those of the multiplications. Indeed, any K-linear application over E can be uniquely expressed as
Hence, the w-th coordinate of M (X) and M (X) can be expressed respectively as:
for some α u,v,w and β u,v,w in E. The function F is defined as in (2), so the w-th coordinate of DF(X, A) is
Then by considering the w-th coordinate of equation (5) we get: c are linearly independent. So, we can derive as many relations as the number of these functions, for each coordinate equation (6) . Since one given coefficient α a,b,c occurs at most four times in all these relations, we can see that many of them are null, since corresponding relations are trivial. Coefficients α u,v,w appearing in non trivial relations, so that may be not null, have the following indexes: (w, 0, w), (w + 1, −λ w , w), (w + 2, −λ w − λ w+1 , w), (w + 1, 0, w + 1), (w, λ w , w + 1), (w − 1, λ w + λ w−1 , w + 1). At this point, we must recall that "w + 1" is in fact the successor of w in (0, . . . , − 1) or that w are taken mod . Hence we may consider that " + 1 = 1" and "1 − 1 = ". This is why we now have to consider two cases: ( = 3, q even), and ( = 3, q odd) or ≥ 5.
-In the first case ( = 3, q even), there are two kinds of "side effect", since "w −1 = w +2" for indexes, and "X +X = 0" in E. In this case, we have Λ = (0, 0, 0), and F (X) = X ⊗R(X). The solutions of equation (5) are in fact the E-linear applications over E . One can check easily that in this case, solutions M of equation (5) can be expressed as α ⊗ X + β ⊗ R(X) + γ ⊗ R(R(X)), for some α, β, and γ in E. Nevertheless, since in equation (4), is in fact equation (5) where M = 0, the only non trivial relations are: α 1,0,1 = α 2,0,2 = α 3,0,3 . Hence we have M (X) = (α 1,0,1 X 1 , α 2,0,2 X 2 , α 3,0,3 X 3 ) = (α 1,0,1 , α 2,0,2 , α 3,0,3 ) ⊗ X.
-In the second case, the only non trivial relations that remain are: α q λw w,0,w + α w+1,0,w+1 = β w,0,w . Hence the result:
By translating this result in the public key with the following property:
we get the next result:
Lemma 2. The linear applications M that satisfy for all X, A in E :
are the "multiplications" N ξ , i.e. the conjugates by S of the multiplications M ξ with ξ satisfying L(ξ) = 0.
We emphasize here that finding the applications of the lemma 2 can be practically achieved, since it can be reduced to the resolution of a linear system.
To conclude this section, we give here the solutions of L(ξ) = 0. We need to show that ξ = 0 is not the only solution, and more precisely that there exist solutions whose coordinates are in E but not in K. This result will be useful later.
Lemma 3. The solutions of equation L(ξ) = 0 are -When q is even, then λ = 0. The solutions satisfy ξ 1 = ξ 2 = . . . = ξ . So ξ = (α, . . . , α) with α in E. -When q is odd, the solutions satisfy ξ
Practical Cryptanalysis of -IC − for small
From now, we focus our attention to the practical cryptanalysis of the 3-IC − signature scheme. This is the signature scheme proposed in [9] . However, we would like to emphasize that the next attack can be easily extended to any -IC − signature scheme.
Roadmap of the Attack
The goal of the attack is to recover -from the truncated public key P Π -the equations that were removed. Namely, to recover the whole set of polynomials P. Once these equations are recovered, the scheme is completely broken since a signature can be efficiently forged using Gröbner bases. The principle of the attack is very similar to the one described against sflash in [10] . First, we recover an invariant matrix N ξ for the mapping DP. This is done by solving a linear system generated from the (public) components of DP Π (see Section 4). This matrix will then permit to reconstruct the whole public key P as we describe in the sequel.
Description of the Attack
What we have to do is first finding one suitable linear application M satisfying:
If r the number of missing coordinates is not too high, all solutions are indeed "multiplications" N ξ according to section 4.
We recall that N ξ = S −1 M ξ S, M ξ being the matrix of multiplication by ξ in E . Since we have the following relation:
by composing the public key P Π by N ξ , we get another set of (n − r) equations. We select randomly r equations among this set. It is very likely that this new set will be independent from the (n − r) of P Π . This is indeed the case if ξ does not have all its coordinates in K or more precisely if M ξ is not diagonal. So, we have in some sense recovered the equations removed. We quoted below some experimental results that we obtained for -IC − . We have done these experiments using the computer algebra Magma 5 . In this Equations linking input and output. It remains anyway to actually forge a signature using this additional knowledge. To this end, we can first try to mimic Patarin's attack on C * . It can be noted that Patarin's bilinear equations also exist for -IC. For instance, when = 3, we can see that :
These are bilinear equations between the input X = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) and output Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 ) of the function F. However, the final bilinear equations is not independent from the two previous equations. We have then only 2k independent equations. In order to have enough independent equations, we can try to add :
This last equation permits to obtain k additional independent equations. It is not bilinear in the left hand side. But, this is not really an issue, since the right hand side is bilinear when char(E)= 2. We mention that these equations can be recovered automatically using Gröbner bases. To do so, we consider the ideal of relations :
This ideal is radical. Thus, a DRL-Gröbner basis G (with
contains a generator set of all the algebraic (independent) relations between the inputs/outputs of F (see Property 1) . In this particular case, we obtain instantaneously (using the computer algebra system Magma) the following basis :
Anyway, this approach does not permit to efficiently forge a signature. Unfortunately, if we try to reconstruct the corresponding equations from the (whole) public key P, we need 2 48 operations for the first set of parameters.
Signature Forgery. To conclude the attack, we will use another classical property of Gröbner basis. Once all the polynomials of P recovered, it is not difficult to forge a signature of a message m ∈ K n by computing a solution of the nonlinear system :
which can be done in practice for real sizes of the parameters. This behavior was already suspected by the authors of the scheme [9] . However, for the sake of completeness, we quoted below some experimental results that we obtained for -IC. We have done these experiments using Magma (v2. In this table, T denotes the amount of time needed to compute a solution of the system (9), for randomly chosen (non-zero) messages m ∈ K n (i.e. to forge a valid signature for m). We mention that T is the time of computing Gröbner basis plus the time to compute the solution from this Gröbner basis. We have also reported the maximum degree d reg reached during Gröbner bases computations. It appears that this degree is bounded from above by a constant (4), leading then to an experimental complexity for systems arising in -IC ( odd) of :
, with 2 ≤ ω < 3 denoting the linear algebra constant.
This implies that whole attack presented in this part is polynomial (in the number n of variables).
A Key-Recovery Attack for -IC − for small
In this part, we show that we can go one step further in the cryptanalysis of the -IC − scheme. Namely, we can recover the secret key (T, S), or at least one equivalent description, when is small. As previously, this attack will combine differential and Gröbner bases techniques. We will only consider the case q even, but once again this attack can easily be extended to other cases.
Equivalent Secret Keys
For an attacker, a total break of -IC is equivalent to finding a description of P such as P = T •F•S. In fact, this description is not unique. Indeed, it can be seen that there exist many equivalent keys [27] . For instance, since
is another valid description. We notice here that M ξ is not only K-linear, but also E-linear. So, more generally, we have to face the problem of finding an equivalent description (T , S ) where
are E-linear.
In the sequel, we will use the fact that a matrix of a K-linear application which is also E-linear can be viewed as a k × k -matrix over K but also as a × -block matrix whose blocks are multiplication by elements of E.
Roadmap of the Attack
To recover one such equivalent secret keys, we consider that S and T can be decomposed into one K-linear part and one E-linear part, according to the previous subsection. In the first part of the attack, we will find the part of S and of T in K and then the parts in E. To recover the part of S in K, called S 0 , we will use the invariants N ξ that we recover using the differential of the public key. Then, once S 0 is recovered, we will find the part of T in K, called T 0 , using the differential DP. In fact, DP depends linearly on S and T and if we compose DP by S −1 0 , then we are able to cancel the part of S in DP. Using some clever ideas we are able to reconstruct some T 0 . Finally, we find the part of S and T in E using Gröbner basis algorithms on the public equation composed on the right by S −1 0 and on the left by T −1 0 . The problem can then be described in E instead of K. In such a case, we have reduced the number of variables to 2 × 2 . Due to the special form of the equations, the two sets of variables are separated, Gröbner basis algorithms are very efficient.
Description of the Attack
Resolution of S 0 . We suppose that we have already recovered the multiplication matrix N ξ (we have then all the polynomials of P). We recall that:
M ξ being a block-diagonal matrix and since ξ = (α, α, α), each block of the diagonal corresponds to the same multiplication matrix by α element of E. Our goal is to recover S from this equality.
To this end, we try to find M ξ . Observe that α is an element of the multiplicative group E * of E. We know that E * is of order q k − 1. Due to the choice of the parameters, we can isolate a small subgroup of E * , not totally included in K * . Note that elements of K must be avoided, otherwise M ξ would be totally diagonal, leading then to linearly dependent equations.
In our example, q = 256 and k = 10, 12, 16. Since k is even, a good candidate for the order is o = q + 1, but any smaller value prime with q − 1 will be possible. Consequently, by raising N ξ to the power a = (q k − 1)/o we get :
and ξ a is of order o. Finally, we can test all elements ρ of order o. For each of them, we try to solve : XN a ξ = M ρ X. Let's suppose that X 1 and X 2 are two particular invertible solutions of this equation. Then Y = X 1 X −1 2 must satisfy the equation :
So, at this step, the solutions for S form the right coset of any particular solution and the subgroup of -by-block-matrices of elements of K, which precisely commute with M ρ . These are exactly the E-linear applications. So, we can pick at random some invertible solution S 0 .
Resolution of T 0 . Next step is to obtain a similar description for T . We would like to gain some information on T from the differential of the public key using linear algebra. We recall that : DP(X, A) = T (DF(S(X), S(A))).
From now, it will be easier to fix the first variable and to see DP X (A) as a linear mapping or equivalently as a matrix. So let's consider v 1 a fixed random vector. Then, consider the expression : 0 is therefore the product of T and an unknown -by-block-matrix of elements of E. Unfortunately, this matrix is not invertible due to the underlying structure of DF. However, this issue can be easily resolved by picking at random a second vector v 2 and some matrix R with -by-blockmultiplications (i.e. R is E-linear) and computing the matrix DP v1 • S Resolution of T and S . In the last step, we compose the public equations on the right by S −1 0 and on the left by T −1 0 , the result is public equations expressed in E instead of K. As explained in [16] , we can recover the components of T and S by solving an algebraic system of equations. In our case, we have reduced the number of variables to 2 × 2 . This is due to the fact we are working over E instead of K. Here, the number of unknowns is very small (2 × 3 2 , for the parameters considerd). The last unknown parameters can easily be retrieved (within a second) using Gröbner bases techniques, as illustrated in the 
Conclusion
We have presented a forgery attack and a key recovery attack on the parameters of the -IC − signature scheme proposed in the original paper. We also shortly discuss that this attack can be extended to all other choices of parameters. The main worry when proposing a multivariate scheme is that the Minus Transformation can be used with attention now, due to the differential attack. Finally, for this scheme and contrary to the SFLASH signature scheme, we show that it is possible to recover the secret keys S and T .
